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JOSEF EALKINGER
To say that supply and demand are brought into balance by adjusting quality, instead of price, to its equilibrium value is of course exaggerated. However, undoubtedly the quality level in a market often changes with the market situation. On the one side, it is perfectly plausible that in a situation of excess demand quality deteriorates. One may think of diminishing service time per client and less careful production under pressure of time or of the use of lower quality inputs when pressure of demand is high. On the other side, with a shortage of demand producers want to attract more consumers by offering a higher quality level (and not only by lowering the price). Actually, disequilibrium situations in markets for products with varying quality level will induce both quality and price adjustments, and the market equilibria will be characterized simultaneously by equilibrium quality and equilibrium price. Thus, if this paper concentrates entirely on market coordination by quality, this is not meant so much as a perfect description of the real world but rather as a thought experiment which makes the point that quality matters (and not only, or sometimes not so much, the price) as clear as possible.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II a simple market model with coordination of supply and demand by quality is outlined. Section III considers policy impacts on the equilibrium level of quality in a single market. Especially, the effects of quality standards and consumer information on the equilibrium level of quality and quantity in the respective market are analyzed. Section IV applies the analysis to the standard model of the macroeconomic goods market Section V contains a summary.
II. MARKET COORDINATION BY QUAUTY
A good, characterized by a quality index q, is offered at price/?. Let.vj = D{p,q) and Xs = S{p,q) be the corresponding demand and supply curve, where AW, XS denote the demanded and supplied quantity, respectively. With respect to the partial derivatives, denoted by subscripts, the usual assumptions are madeÂ ssumption l:Dp<0 ,Dg>0 ,Sp>0 ,Sq<0 .
The usual market diagram focuses on the price mechanism. Accordingly, it is drawn in the price-quantity space with/? and jt on the axes. Quality enters the picture as an exogenous parameter which shifts equilibrium price and quantity. To put quality (instead of the price) in the center of investigation means that the market analysis has to be carried out in the {q, .ï)-space. Measuring quality along the ordinate we have, according to Assumption 1, a positively declined demand curve and a negatively declined supply curve, respectively. They are represented in Figure 1 . The market equilibrium, E, is now characterized by a certain equilibrium level of quality, "q. Figure 1 S(p.q) The question is, what happens if quality is out of its equilibrium value? Suppose ^0 > ^. Then demand is in excess of supply (in Figure 1 the line AB represents the corresponding level of excess demand). As argued in the introduction, pressure of demand has a negative effect on the quality level of the goods supplied for various reason. The resulting pressure on input requirements leads to the use of less qualified inputs or the pressure on time makes production and service less careful. Thus, if ço > ^ then the quality level is adjusted towards its equilibrium value 'q and excess demand is reduced. Consider now qo < q. In this case demand falls short of supply and producers will raise the quality level of their supply in order to attract more consumers. Again, the quality level 471 is adjusted towards the equilibrium value q. These considerations show that the diagramm presented in Figure 1 represents a meaningful tool for the analysis of market coordination by quality.
The price of the relevant good enters the picture as an exogenous parameter. Suppose for example that/? rises iop\ Then, according to Assumption 1, the supply curve is shifted to the right and the demand curve is shifted to the left, respectively. The situation is represented in Figure 2 . As a result, the market equilibrium is moved from point E to E' which corresponds to a comparatively higher level of equilibrium quality, 'q\ The impact on the equilibrium level of quantity cannot be determined without more specific assumptions.
The further analysis will show that the simple diagrams presented in this section are an efficient and elegant tool for discussing interesting economic problems in the sphere of industrial organization and of macroeconomics.
TOWARD A QUALITY-CENTERED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS m. POLICY IMPACTS ON THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF QUAUTY
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effects on product quality of some common policy measures like quality standards and consumer information.
Quality Standards
Suppose that a restriction q>qo for some standard ^o>^ is introduced in a market with equilibrium quality ^. The result is, according to Figure 1 , an excess demand. Since quality must not be lowered, prices may rise until, according to Figure 2 , a new equilibrium at ^' > qo is reached. In sum, introducing a binding quality standard leads to higher product quality and to excess demand or an increase of price.
Uncertain Quality and Consumer Information
A less trivial task is the clarification of the impact on quality of consumer information.
Consumers are often imperfectly informed about product quality. That means, demand cannot be based on a certain value of quality. Rather the consumer is confronted with a more or less uncertain level of quality. Let q be the actual quality level of the supplied good. For an imperfectly informed consumer the judgement of quality is disturbed by a random term E SO that to him quality is a random variable 5 = ^ + e.
(
Now, imperfect information about quality can mean two things. The consumer can have wrong expectations or he is (more or less) uncertain that he gets the expected quality. The following definitions make this distinction precise: i) Consumers have wrong expectation of quality, if E{z)^^ and thus ii) Given q = q + t,q" = q + z' with E(t) = E (e'). Consumers have a higher quality risk if e' > /?se and thus 5' > Rsq. where > RS denote the Rothschild and Stiglitz ordering of risks.
Since quality is now a random variable for the consumer, the concept of the demand curve as a function of quality and price must be reconsidered. The natural modification oí Dq>0 (Assumption 1), is to assume that, given the quality risk, demand increases with expected quality.
Assumption 2: Suppose, q' = Rsq. Then, D {p, q') >D (p,q) if E {q') >E(q).
The dependence of demand on the risk of q is less evident. A plausible assumption is that consumers react to quality risk with caution . Accordingly, we formulate Assumption 3: Suppose, E (q') = e (q). Then, D {p,q') < D (p,q) \íq' > Rsq.
Policy measures providing consumers with information about product quality can thus have the following impacts. 2. Admittedly, we do not have a decision-theoretic argument, which generally excludes that consumers buy comparatively more if quality is risky. In that case, which however seems less plausible intuitively, the sign of the risk effects analyzed in this section would be reversed.
TOWARD A QUALITY-CENTERED ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
First, they may correct a wrong expectation of quality. Formally, they correct e with E {e)^0 to EO with Zo = RSE and E (Zo) = 0. According to Assumption 2, that means, the demand curve is shifted to the left (to the right) if £ (e) > 0 (if E (e) < 0, respectively). Figure 3 illustrates the situation for the case E (e) > 0, that is, if consumers overestimate the quality level before they become informed about the true quality that can be expected.
Consumer information shifts the market equilibrium from point EoioEi.So it increases quality and decreases quantity in the relevant market. Obviously, if consumers underestimate quality before they become informed, then the effects are reversed.
Secondly, policy measures providing information about product quality to consumers may change the uncertainty about actual product quality, given its expected level. Let e, e' with E{e) = E (e') represent the relevant quality risks before the provision of information about product quality to the consumer and after the provision of information, respectively. Usually, information will reduce uncertainty about quality. That means, e' < RSE. According to Assumption 3, the demand curve is shifted to the right in this case. See Figure 4 . As a result, quality decreases and quantity increases in the relevant market. At first glance, the conclusion that consumer information about product quality decreases the equilibrium level of quality in the respective market is somewhat surprising. The reason behind this result is that with less uncertainty about quality a lower level of quality suffices to induce a certain level of demand.
However, providing the consumer with information about product quality may also increase his uncertainty. Note that it is the consumer's subjective view which is relevant for demand behavior. If a consumer becomes better informed, then he sees the true risk more clearly. It may be higher than the consumer's view of the risk before information. One could also say, consumers become more critical in the sense that they are increasingly aware of the variability of quality in the market. In this case, e' >y?s£. According to Assumption 3, the demand curve is shifted to the left. As a result, quality increases and quantity decreases in the considered market.
Summing up, one can say that measures which provide consumers with information about product quality have a quality-increasing and quantitydecreasing effect if consumers overestimate quality or underestimate the variability of product quality in a market; that is, if information makes consumers more critical. Information which corrects an underestimation of quality by consumers or which reduces the consumer's quality risk in a market leads to an equilibrium with a comparatively lower level of quality and higher level of quantity. To get from these general conclusions to a definite statement or testable hypothesis concerning the effect of a concrete policy measure, one has to find out, how the measure affects the mind of the consumers. This is of course a speculative task. In the following, I will present a list of hypotheses which are suggested by the above analysis. (At this point, it is necessary to recall the restrictions of the analysis. It concentrates on partial equilibria in a competitive market with fixed price and variable quality).
The first two hypotheses concern measures which affect the consumers' expectation value of the product quality in a market. They are related to the analysis in Figure 3 .
Hypothesis I : Information exposing that fake is not unusual in some branch (the one or the other Weinskandal may serve as an example) leads to a downward revision of the consumers' expectation of quality. Thus, according to the above analysis, a scandal induces an increase of product quality and a reduction of quantity in the respective market.
Hypothesis 2: Cooperative campaignes to raise the image of a branch, if successful, lead to an upward revision of the consumers' expectation of quality. According to the above analysis, the induced shift of market equilibrium is characterized by a comparatively lower level of quality and a higher level of quantity.
The next two hypotheses deal with measures which affect the consumers' uncertainty about product quality. They are related to the analysis in Figure 4 .
Hypothesis 3: General consumer education tells consumers to be aware of the variability of quality supplied. Thus it increases the consumers' uncertainty and, according to the above analysis, leads to an increase of quality and decrease of quantity in all markets with imperfect quality information.
Hypothesis 4: Specific Consumer Reports or Warentests reduce the quality risk for the consumer. Thus, the diffusion of such tests and reports, leads to a shift of the market equilibrium towards more quantity and a comparatively lower quality level.
The last two hypotheses describe possible dynamics suggested by the above analysis. The idea is that true product quality is detected with time.
Hypothesis 5: Consumers' expectation of quality is revised downwards/upwards if the quality of the product is overestimated/underestimated, respectively. Thus, according to the analysis in Figure 3 , the quality level will rise and quantity decline in a market with initially overestimated products, and vice versa if the quality of a newly introduced product is underestimated at the beginning.
Hypothesis 6: Experience and learning reduces the quality risk. Thus, the above analysis (Figure 4) predicts that, other things being equal, the market size increases and the quality level declines with time.
IV. THE MACROECONOMIC GOODS MARKET
The relevant price in conventional macroeconomic goods-market analysis is the interest rate, i. It coordinates the consumption-savings behavior with investment decisions. Pursuing the idea that consumer decisions are not only governed by prices but also by quality, one comes to the conclusion that besides the interest rate the development of product quality is an important factor for the consumption-saving decision and thus for the macroeconomic goods market equilibrium. Recently, different authors have put forward models of long-run growth based on endogenous product innovations which upgrade quality over time (see SEGERSTROM, AN ANT and DINOPOULIS [1990] , GROSSMAN and HELPMAN [1991] and the references there). The following considerations concentrate on short-run problems and take the development of quality as given.
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Let qo, q\ be the (index oí) present and future quality of consumption goods, respectively.
The Consumption and Saving Decision
Consumers have common preferences. Utility in period / is a function, u{cuqt), of income spent on consumption, a, and of the quality of the consumption goods, qt. Assumption 4 summarizes standard assumptions concerning marginal utility. Assumption4: Uc >O,Uq> 0, Ucc<O,Ucq> 0. For deciding how much of his present income, y, he spends and how much he saves, the consumer maximizes the sum of present and (discounted by some factor Ô) future utility, subject to the budget constraint
(The price level is held constant.) To avoid aggregation problems, homothetic preferences are usually assumed. Thus, suppose that u is homogenous in c. Then, maximization of (2) (under restriction (3)) with respect to co is equivalent to maximization of
with respect to z = Co/y . The fu-st-order-condition for z is: 
For a given interest rate, it defines the propensity to consume as a function, z (qo, qi), of present and future product quality. Because of the homogeneity assumption, the propensity to consume does not vary with the consumer's income. Differentiating F implicitly, we get, under Assumption 4, dz/dqo > 0 and dz/dqi < 0 .
Since the propensity to consume, defined by condition (5), is independent of the consumer's income (due to the homogeneity assumption), aggregate consumption, C, is given by the equation
= z{qo,qi)Y.
{Y denotes aggregate income).
(7)

The IS-Curve in the Quality-Income Space
It is problematical to argue that also investment behavior is govemed by the development of product quality. Only questionable assumptions conceming the dependence of investment on quality could be made. Therefore, the more adequate procedure is to see investment independent of quality. Let / be the exogenously given level of investment. Then, in view of (7), the goods market equilibrium is characterized by the condition Using (6), one can draw the corresponding IS-curve in the quality-income space. We find that the IS-curve is positively sloped in the (7, ^o)-space and negatively sloped in the (K, q\)-spnct. The precise shape of the curves is of course not determined. Figure 5 a and b present stylized versions of these IS-curves (where 2(0,<7i) = z{qo,°°) = 0 and z{qo,0) = z(oo,qi) = 1 is assumed).
Product Quality and the Problem of Effective Demand
The IS-curve describes the possible goods market equilibria. A problem of effective demand arises if the realized equilibrium income falls short of the full employment level. The point of this paper is to concentrate on quality adjustments (instead of the usually considered mechanism of price adjustments) in the analysis of markets. The relevant price in the macroeconomic goods market is the interest rate, and a problem of effective demand arises if the interest rate does not fall to the level corresponding to full employment. Now, the present Figure 6 IS-Curve analysis takes the interest rate as given and concentrates on the role of present and future product quality. Accordingly, a problem of effective demand arises if, for whatever reasons, quality does not adjust to the level corresponding to full capacity. This is illustrated in Figure 6 .
Let Yf be capacity output Then, the level of present quality (given future quality), which guarantees that full employment is realized, is qf. If actual product quality is restricted by some upper limit q<qf, then only the underemployment equilibrium income Y will be realized. Possible reasons for the existence of an upper limit of quality are technical bottlenecks (for instance lack of high-quality inputs or of high precision machinery), education and training problems but also institutional arrangements like patent restrictions. (Of course, one could draw an analogous diagram with respect to future quality. It is easy to see that an underemployment equilibrium results if future quality is restricted by some lower bound. That means, if the consumer's expectations concerning future quality are so high that they save too much).
As far as economic policy is concerned. Figure 6 shows that in principle three types of policy measures exist by which an underemployment equilibrium can be overcome. First, quality-independent expansion of demand shifts the relevant IS-curve to the right so that the full-employment equilibrium D is realized. Secondly, labor-supply management reduces capacity output to Y so that rbecomes a full-employment equilibrium. Or, finally, measures promoting and diffusing high quality production shifts the quality restriction upwards until the equilibrium point Q is reached. Of course, these are very partial considerations, since interest rate, wage rate and price level matter in the real world. However, to undertake a thought experiment which emphasizes the usually neglected role of product quality is the purpose of this analysis.
